1 00:00:01,034 --> 00:00:02,275 3000. 2 00:00:03,620 --> 00:00:05,206 We're not getting any oxygen. 3 00:00:07,896 --> 00:00:09,448 We are in an emergency. 4 00:00:27,000 --> 00:00:28,931 Modern airliners are among the most 5 00:00:29,034 --> 00:00:31,655 complex and reliable machines in common use. 6 00:00:31,758 --> 00:00:37,137 But occasionally, delays in fixing a known defect have led to disaster. 7 00:00:39,310 --> 00:00:42,344 This is a story of one of the most terrifying 8 00:00:42,448 --> 00:00:45,034 and avoidable accidents in recent history. 9 00:00:45,137 --> 00:00:49,896 When a 747 suffered a devastating explosion at high altitude, 10 00:00:50,000 --> 00:00:53,586 the crew and passengers faced an unprecedented crisis. 11 00:00:55,517 --> 00:00:58,655 It is also a story of how one family's grief 12 00:00:58,758 --> 00:01:01,034 led to a relentless investigation 13 00:01:01,137 --> 00:01:04,034 to uncover the full, disturbing truth. 14 00:01:04,137 --> 00:01:06,586 Lee can't have died for nothing. 15 00:01:06,689 --> 00:01:09,310 You know, you've got to find out why he died 16 00:01:09,413 --> 00:01:13,310 and you've got to make sure that it never happens again. 17 00:01:14,551 --> 00:01:18,137 And it reveals how other known problems in aircraft design 18 00:01:18,241 --> 00:01:19,965 have continued to go uncorrected 19 00:01:20,068 --> 00:01:23,827 causing further avoidable accidents. 20 00:01:23,931 --> 00:01:26,137 So would I be surprised if it happened again? 21 00:01:26,241 --> 00:01:28,620 I would be surprised if it didn't happen again. 22 00:01:28,724 --> 00:01:30,379 It is a matter of time. 23 00:01:43,793 --> 00:01:46,827 One of the most shocking cases of a known design flaw 24 00:01:46,931 --> 00:01:49,965 being ignored for years would finally take its toll 25 00:01:50,068 --> 00:01:52,241 on the United Airlines 747 26 00:01:52,344 --> 00:01:55,482 bound from Honolulu to Auckland, New Zealand. 27 00:02:00,689 --> 00:02:03,241 As flight 811 prepared for take-off, 28 00:02:03,344 --> 00:02:06,137 the crew were concerned with another kind of threat 29 00:02:06,241 --> 00:02:08,448 that had recently led to tragedy. 30 00:02:09,310 --> 00:02:11,586 We were in the aftermath of Lockarbee. 31 00:02:11,689 --> 00:02:14,689 And I had instructed the crew to be particularly aware 32 00:02:14,793 --> 00:02:18,724 because it was a through flight from Los Angeles 33 00:02:18,827 --> 00:02:20,689 going through to New Zealand. 34 00:02:20,793 --> 00:02:23,413 So in my pre-flight briefing, 35 00:02:23,517 --> 00:02:27,241 I had asked them to make sure that they checked any baggage 36 00:02:27,344 --> 00:02:32,517 that looked suspicious or anything because we wanted to be extra cautious. 37 00:02:34,206 --> 00:02:36,379 Flight 811 was heavily loaded. 38 00:02:36,482 --> 00:02:42,034 337 passengers, packed cargo holds, and a full fuel load. 39 00:02:46,275 --> 00:02:48,896 The doors closed on time and the plane left the gate 40 00:02:49,000 --> 00:02:50,482 just before 2 o'clock in the morning 41 00:02:50,586 --> 00:02:53,000 for a routine 8-hour flight. 42 00:02:55,517 --> 00:02:58,172 Well, we were going to New Zealand on vacation. 43 00:02:58,275 --> 00:03:02,137 Someplace that we had really thought was interesting. 44 00:03:02,241 --> 00:03:04,827 And somebody had told us how beautiful it was, 45 00:03:04,931 --> 00:03:06,931 so this was kind of a dream come true. 46 00:03:09,034 --> 00:03:12,344 I was seated in what's called the upper deck. 47 00:03:12,448 --> 00:03:14,310 I hadn't had a vacation in five years 48 00:03:14,413 --> 00:03:17,724 and I took all my MileagePlus points from United Airlines 49 00:03:17,827 --> 00:03:20,275 and I purchased a business-class ticket 50 00:03:20,379 --> 00:03:22,689 to Auckland, New Zealand, and Sydney, Australia. 51 00:03:22,793 --> 00:03:24,965 I was going to finally make that dream vacation 52 00:03:25,068 --> 00:03:27,448 I'd always wanted, to get to Australia 53 00:03:27,551 --> 00:03:29,000 and lie on a beach somewhere, 54 00:03:29,103 --> 00:03:31,965 and forget about airplanes, forget about accidents 55 00:03:32,068 --> 00:03:34,517 and get this out of my mind for a while. 56 00:03:45,310 --> 00:03:49,137 On the flight deck, Captain Dave Cronin was hugely experienced. 57 00:03:49,241 --> 00:03:51,379 Just two months short of retirement. 58 00:03:51,482 --> 00:03:52,724 Rotate. 59 00:03:57,724 --> 00:04:01,103 I flew almost 35 years with United. 60 00:04:01,206 --> 00:04:03,896 I've got over 30 000 hours of flight time 61 00:04:04,000 --> 00:04:08,344 in just about everything. Military as well as civilian. 62 00:04:10,172 --> 00:04:13,827 My co-pilot or first officer was Al Slaytor. 63 00:04:13,931 --> 00:04:19,344 And I've known Al at that time for probably 20 years. 64 00:04:20,586 --> 00:04:23,241 And the second officer, Mark Thomas, 65 00:04:23,344 --> 00:04:25,793 it was the first time I had flown with him, 66 00:04:25,896 --> 00:04:28,620 but we got along real well. 67 00:04:30,275 --> 00:04:31,586 Tell them we can handle 33, 68 00:04:31,689 --> 00:04:33,241 if it's available. - Okay. 69 00:04:33,344 --> 00:04:36,413 The pilots wanted to climb to 33 000 feet 70 00:04:36,517 --> 00:04:40,310 above the Pacific Ocean to avoid turbulence from bad weather. 71 00:04:40,413 --> 00:04:42,931 We did notice that there were thunderstorms 72 00:04:43,034 --> 00:04:46,241 a hundred miles south right on course, 73 00:04:46,344 --> 00:04:49,103 which is rather unusual for that time of night, 74 00:04:49,206 --> 00:04:51,586 so I left the seat belt sign on. 75 00:04:53,275 --> 00:04:57,241 Capt Cronin's decision to keep people fastened in their seats 76 00:04:57,344 --> 00:04:59,413 would save the lives of many. 77 00:05:00,793 --> 00:05:04,068 We were still climbing out and the seatbelt sign was still on. 78 00:05:04,172 --> 00:05:06,586 And uh... just basically getting ready 79 00:05:06,689 --> 00:05:10,068 to serve beverages, and then to tuck everyone in for the evening 80 00:05:10,172 --> 00:05:13,206 because it was going to be a long flight down to New Zealand. 81 00:05:13,965 --> 00:05:16,482 Okay, tell them we are going to detour over to the left. 82 00:05:16,586 --> 00:05:18,551 Centre? United 811 heavy. 83 00:05:18,655 --> 00:05:20,586 We're going to be detouring over some weather here. 84 00:05:20,689 --> 00:05:22,758 It will be to the left, of course. 85 00:05:22,862 --> 00:05:25,241 100 miles from Honolulu, 86 00:05:25,344 --> 00:05:28,655 as flight 811 climbed through 23 000 feet, 87 00:05:28,758 --> 00:05:31,448 a critical malfunction was about to occur. 88 00:05:32,827 --> 00:05:34,896 There was now a huge air pressure difference 89 00:05:35,000 --> 00:05:37,448 between the inside and outside of the aircraft. 90 00:05:39,206 --> 00:05:41,517 Suddenly, passengers sitting just above 91 00:05:41,620 --> 00:05:44,172 and behind the cargo door heard a noise. 92 00:05:44,275 --> 00:05:47,034 There was kind of a grinding noise. 93 00:05:52,448 --> 00:05:54,379 I heard like a thud. 94 00:05:57,517 --> 00:05:58,793 What the hell? 95 00:05:58,896 --> 00:06:00,586 In the next nanosecond, 96 00:06:00,689 --> 00:06:03,896 it was pure unadulterated pandemonium. 97 00:06:13,034 --> 00:06:15,137 - We lost number three. - Going down. 98 00:06:15,241 --> 00:06:17,034 It looks like we've lost number three engine. 99 00:06:17,137 --> 00:06:18,793 And we are descending rapidly. 100 00:06:18,896 --> 00:06:20,103 Coming back. 101 00:06:22,827 --> 00:06:26,413 The next thing I knew, I found myself on the stairwell 102 00:06:26,517 --> 00:06:28,827 hanging onto the rungs 103 00:06:28,931 --> 00:06:31,931 and I immediately knew it was an explosive decompression. 104 00:06:34,413 --> 00:06:36,413 The cargo door had torn off 105 00:06:36,517 --> 00:06:38,896 and ripped a huge section of the plane with it. 106 00:06:39,000 --> 00:06:41,655 The pressurized air inside blasted out 107 00:06:41,758 --> 00:06:43,482 with explosive force. 108 00:06:44,793 --> 00:06:46,758 I immediately thought of Lockarbee. 109 00:06:46,862 --> 00:06:49,206 We actually thought it was a bomb that went off. 110 00:06:50,517 --> 00:06:52,586 It was hell on earth. 111 00:06:52,689 --> 00:06:55,344 Everything on the airplane that wasn't fastened down, 112 00:06:55,448 --> 00:06:58,862 tied down, or secured became airborne. 113 00:06:58,965 --> 00:07:01,827 The noise was incredible. 114 00:07:04,172 --> 00:07:06,206 Everything in front of us was gone. 115 00:07:06,310 --> 00:07:09,724 Where we were sitting, we were about six inches from the hole. 116 00:07:09,827 --> 00:07:13,379 So, there was nothing in front of us or to the side of us. 117 00:07:13,482 --> 00:07:15,068 The whole side of the plane was gone. 118 00:07:15,172 --> 00:07:17,241 Actually, our feet were dangling on the hole. 119 00:07:17,344 --> 00:07:20,620 And I first thought we weren't going to make it. 120 00:07:20,724 --> 00:07:22,689 I just didn't think there was any hope. 121 00:07:24,482 --> 00:07:26,724 With the pressurized air blown out, 122 00:07:26,827 --> 00:07:29,482 the lack of oxygen at 23 000 feet 123 00:07:29,586 --> 00:07:32,137 was now suffocating the passengers and the crew. 124 00:07:32,931 --> 00:07:35,206 It felt like someone had kicked me in the stomach. 125 00:07:35,310 --> 00:07:37,103 Knocked the wind out of me. 126 00:07:37,206 --> 00:07:41,344 And I remember trying to catch my breath... 127 00:07:41,448 --> 00:07:43,275 and couldn't. 128 00:07:43,862 --> 00:07:47,206 We were re supposed to grab those oxygen masks and put them on. 129 00:07:47,310 --> 00:07:49,862 Except those oxygen masks in that cabin, 130 00:07:49,965 --> 00:07:53,000 they were ripped out of the ceiling and they weren't there. 131 00:07:53,103 --> 00:07:55,965 And... I remember thinking to myself: 132 00:07:56,068 --> 00:07:57,448 "This is what it feels like to suffocate." 133 00:07:57,551 --> 00:07:59,413 United 811 heavy. 134 00:07:59,517 --> 00:08:01,827 We are doing an emergency decent. 135 00:08:01,931 --> 00:08:04,379 The pilots could tell from their instruments 136 00:08:04,482 --> 00:08:06,482 that the number 3 engine was failing, 137 00:08:06,586 --> 00:08:08,689 but they couldn't tell the full extent of the damage. 138 00:08:08,793 --> 00:08:11,344 Their priority was to get the plane down to a level 139 00:08:11,448 --> 00:08:13,241 where they could breathe normally. 140 00:08:13,758 --> 00:08:15,551 Put your mask on, Dave. 141 00:08:18,137 --> 00:08:20,655 But the pilots didn't know that the explosion 142 00:08:20,758 --> 00:08:23,482 had destroyed the entire oxygen supply. 143 00:08:23,586 --> 00:08:25,965 Can't get any oxygen. 144 00:08:26,068 --> 00:08:27,379 We're not getting any oxygen. 145 00:08:27,482 --> 00:08:29,517 You getting any? - I can't get any either. 146 00:08:29,620 --> 00:08:32,103 With the plane heading steeply down 147 00:08:32,206 --> 00:08:33,862 and no word from the cockpit, 148 00:08:33,965 --> 00:08:36,068 the cabin crew feared the worst. 149 00:08:36,931 --> 00:08:39,172 I remember thinking that the cockpit, 150 00:08:39,275 --> 00:08:40,965 which is in the upper deck, 151 00:08:41,068 --> 00:08:42,862 had probably blown off the airplane too. 152 00:08:42,965 --> 00:08:45,000 Because as far up as we could see, there was nothing there. 153 00:08:47,655 --> 00:08:50,206 Now we're doing this... nose dive, 154 00:08:50,310 --> 00:08:51,689 my next thought was: 155 00:08:51,793 --> 00:08:53,827 Oh my God, we're just going straight down. 156 00:08:53,931 --> 00:08:55,448 We're just going to crash into the sea." 157 00:08:56,551 --> 00:08:58,310 With its airframe ruptured, 158 00:08:58,413 --> 00:09:00,827 severe damage to the right wing and engines 159 00:09:00,931 --> 00:09:04,068 and the crew forcing it down in an emergency decent, 160 00:09:04,172 --> 00:09:08,344 the problems on Flight 811 had only just begun. 161 00:09:14,241 --> 00:09:16,275 Two minutes after suffering 162 00:09:16,379 --> 00:09:18,655 a devastating explosive decompression, 163 00:09:18,758 --> 00:09:22,551 Flight 811 was still in a steep emergency decent 164 00:09:22,655 --> 00:09:25,103 passing rapidly through 15 000 feet 165 00:09:25,206 --> 00:09:27,034 to reach breathable air. 166 00:09:27,137 --> 00:09:29,482 United 811 heavy. State your altitude now. 167 00:09:29,586 --> 00:09:32,206 Even 15. United 811 heavy. 168 00:09:32,310 --> 00:09:34,275 We're on a 15.5. 169 00:09:34,379 --> 00:09:36,206 United 811. Roger. 170 00:09:36,310 --> 00:09:38,448 I think we blew a door or something. 171 00:09:38,551 --> 00:09:40,965 Tell the flight attendant to get prepared for an evacuation. 172 00:09:41,068 --> 00:09:45,034 The crew finally began to level out at a safer altitude. 173 00:09:45,137 --> 00:09:48,068 But they now faced a barrage of problems. 174 00:09:49,379 --> 00:09:51,931 The most immediate was the disintegration 175 00:09:52,034 --> 00:09:54,724 of the number 3 engine nearest to the explosion. 176 00:09:57,551 --> 00:09:59,344 We don't have any fire indications? 177 00:09:59,448 --> 00:10:02,862 I... I don't have anything. 178 00:10:03,620 --> 00:10:05,068 Okay, we lost number 3. 179 00:10:05,862 --> 00:10:07,965 Let's shut it down. 180 00:10:08,068 --> 00:10:09,206 Yeah, okay. 181 00:10:09,310 --> 00:10:11,896 Ready for number 3. Shut down checklist. 182 00:10:14,034 --> 00:10:16,931 Number 3... Before you shut down number 3, 183 00:10:17,034 --> 00:10:18,413 the generator went off. 184 00:10:19,724 --> 00:10:21,275 It looks alright to try it now. 185 00:10:30,931 --> 00:10:32,965 Well, that stopped the vibration anyway. 186 00:10:33,068 --> 00:10:34,586 Fuel jettison procedure. 187 00:10:34,689 --> 00:10:36,448 Main boost pumps. On. 188 00:10:36,551 --> 00:10:38,137 Centre. United 811. 189 00:10:38,241 --> 00:10:39,655 We need the equipment standing by, 190 00:10:39,758 --> 00:10:40,862 company notified please. 191 00:10:40,965 --> 00:10:42,793 We got a control problem. 192 00:10:42,896 --> 00:10:45,931 Centre wing, left right valves, on. 193 00:10:46,034 --> 00:10:48,620 - Start dumping the fuel. - I am dumping. 194 00:10:50,448 --> 00:10:54,000 One stewardess had been seriously injured by falling debris. 195 00:10:54,103 --> 00:10:56,068 As Laura Brentlinger helped her, 196 00:10:56,172 --> 00:10:59,724 the full gravity of their situation suddenly became clear. 197 00:11:00,586 --> 00:11:02,206 As I am holding her in my arms, 198 00:11:02,310 --> 00:11:03,896 I looked up and as I looked up, 199 00:11:04,000 --> 00:11:07,275 that was the first time I saw this tremendous hole 200 00:11:07,379 --> 00:11:09,965 on the side of the aircraft that was just a void, 201 00:11:10,068 --> 00:11:13,034 and seats were missing and I immediately knew 202 00:11:13,137 --> 00:11:15,000 that we had lost passengers. 203 00:11:17,517 --> 00:11:19,758 Five rows of seats had been blown out 204 00:11:19,862 --> 00:11:23,862 in the decompression, killing nine passengers. 205 00:11:23,965 --> 00:11:26,103 On the flight deck, the crew had turned 206 00:11:26,206 --> 00:11:28,482 the stricken plane back to Honolulu, 207 00:11:28,586 --> 00:11:30,586 but with 80 miles still to go, 208 00:11:30,689 --> 00:11:32,896 the crisis now got far worse. 209 00:11:33,000 --> 00:11:35,137 We got a helluva control problem here. 210 00:11:35,241 --> 00:11:36,689 I got almost full rudder on this thing. 211 00:11:36,793 --> 00:11:38,275 Are you dumping as fast as you can? 212 00:11:38,379 --> 00:11:39,862 I'm dumping everything. 213 00:11:39,965 --> 00:11:41,827 We got a problem with number 4 engine? 214 00:11:41,931 --> 00:11:42,827 Yeah. 215 00:11:42,931 --> 00:11:44,517 Debris from the explosion 216 00:11:44,620 --> 00:11:47,103 had also damaged the number 4 engine. 217 00:11:47,206 --> 00:11:50,758 If it fell completely, the implications were severe. 218 00:11:50,862 --> 00:11:52,965 If you're on two engines 219 00:11:53,068 --> 00:11:56,482 and you weigh 700 pounds, that is a big deal. 220 00:11:57,517 --> 00:12:00,241 Simply because with that kind of weight, 221 00:12:00,344 --> 00:12:03,241 two engines are not going to keep you in the air. 222 00:12:03,344 --> 00:12:05,206 You are going to come down. 223 00:12:09,827 --> 00:12:12,551 - Can you maintain 240? - Just barely. 224 00:12:16,103 --> 00:12:17,413 We're losing altitude. 225 00:12:18,241 --> 00:12:19,448 I know it. 226 00:12:20,413 --> 00:12:22,448 Centre. United 811 heavy. 227 00:12:22,551 --> 00:12:23,793 Do you have a fix on us? 228 00:12:23,896 --> 00:12:25,172 Affirmative, sir, I have you on radar. 229 00:12:25,275 --> 00:12:27,517 Okay, we've lost engine number 3 230 00:12:27,620 --> 00:12:30,241 and we don't have full power on engine number 4. 231 00:12:30,344 --> 00:12:32,827 We can't hold altitude right now. 232 00:12:32,931 --> 00:12:36,517 We're dumping fuel so... 811 heavy, roger. 233 00:12:36,620 --> 00:12:39,103 I see you're 60 miles south of Honolulu at this time. 234 00:12:39,206 --> 00:12:40,344 Roger. 235 00:12:40,448 --> 00:12:41,448 I haven't talked to anybody yet. 236 00:12:41,551 --> 00:12:43,206 I can't get to them. 237 00:12:43,965 --> 00:12:45,482 You want me to go downstairs and take a look? 238 00:12:45,586 --> 00:12:47,586 Yeah, let's see what's happening down there. 239 00:12:47,689 --> 00:12:49,827 I think we lost a compressor, but-- 240 00:12:49,931 --> 00:12:52,344 Can't hold... can't hold altitude. 241 00:12:52,448 --> 00:12:54,931 - I told them that-- - Get some axe on there. 242 00:12:55,034 --> 00:12:57,172 I got to take off power on this thing. 243 00:12:57,275 --> 00:12:58,448 Whatever you need, Captain. 244 00:12:59,551 --> 00:13:02,000 Although their number 4 engine was failing, 245 00:13:02,103 --> 00:13:05,793 the pilots pushed it, along with the remaining engines to full power. 246 00:13:05,896 --> 00:13:08,965 A setting they should not be running for more than four minutes. 247 00:13:09,689 --> 00:13:12,172 But the nearest land was 50 minutes away. 248 00:13:13,000 --> 00:13:15,551 I look out the window on the right-hand side 249 00:13:15,655 --> 00:13:18,172 and I see flames, big flames. 250 00:13:19,137 --> 00:13:21,344 And I know what flames in an engine means. 251 00:13:21,448 --> 00:13:22,551 It's not good. 252 00:13:22,655 --> 00:13:24,103 The pilots were unaware 253 00:13:24,206 --> 00:13:26,655 that the number 4 engine was now on fire. 254 00:13:26,758 --> 00:13:29,172 You've got 250 knots now, that's good. 255 00:13:29,275 --> 00:13:30,862 7000... 256 00:13:30,965 --> 00:13:32,689 Yeah. We're getting more rumble. 257 00:13:32,793 --> 00:13:34,137 Watch your heading, watch your heading, 258 00:13:34,241 --> 00:13:35,862 you want to go direct to Honolulu. 259 00:13:35,965 --> 00:13:37,172 Okay. I'm gonna go downstairs 260 00:13:37,275 --> 00:13:38,482 and see what the hell is going on. 261 00:13:38,586 --> 00:13:41,034 Go ahead and run down and see what's happening. 262 00:13:42,448 --> 00:13:46,724 I saw the flight engineer descend down the stairwell. 263 00:13:47,793 --> 00:13:50,310 And when I saw him, my relief was: 264 00:13:50,413 --> 00:13:52,172 "Oh my God, they're alive." 265 00:13:52,275 --> 00:13:54,655 And there was a huge sense of relief for me. 266 00:13:54,758 --> 00:13:58,517 He saw the hole and turned as white as a sheet. 267 00:13:58,620 --> 00:14:02,034 And I screamed to him: "Dear God, please get us down." 268 00:14:03,655 --> 00:14:05,379 We got a fire out there. 269 00:14:05,482 --> 00:14:07,724 Oh yeah. We got a fire on number 4. 270 00:14:07,827 --> 00:14:09,551 Go through the procedure. 271 00:14:09,655 --> 00:14:11,034 Shut down the engine. 272 00:14:11,137 --> 00:14:13,344 We're not gonna be able to hold this altitude on two. 273 00:14:19,965 --> 00:14:21,827 We got a fire on the right side. 274 00:14:22,448 --> 00:14:23,689 We're on two engines now. 275 00:14:23,793 --> 00:14:25,275 The whole right side is just gone 276 00:14:25,379 --> 00:14:28,034 from about the one right back to uh... It's just open. 277 00:14:28,137 --> 00:14:29,620 You're just looking outside. 278 00:14:29,724 --> 00:14:31,793 - What do you mean? - It looks like a bomb. 279 00:14:31,896 --> 00:14:33,344 - Fuselage? - Yeah, the fuselage. 280 00:14:33,448 --> 00:14:34,586 It's just... It's just open. 281 00:14:38,241 --> 00:14:40,275 Okay, it looks like we've got a bomb 282 00:14:40,379 --> 00:14:42,379 that went off on the right side. 283 00:14:42,482 --> 00:14:44,310 The whole right side is gone. 284 00:14:44,413 --> 00:14:46,965 Yeah, from about the one right back to uh... 285 00:14:47,068 --> 00:14:48,413 Anybody... 286 00:14:49,758 --> 00:14:51,931 Some people are probably gone, I don't know. 287 00:14:56,103 --> 00:14:57,896 I knew that we had lost people. 288 00:14:58,000 --> 00:14:59,862 I didn't know how many. 289 00:14:59,965 --> 00:15:02,896 In fact, I didn't know until the next day 290 00:15:03,000 --> 00:15:04,689 how many were lost. 291 00:15:04,793 --> 00:15:06,137 But... 292 00:15:07,793 --> 00:15:09,758 You know, it's a terrible thing 293 00:15:09,862 --> 00:15:11,137 when you're a captain of an airplane 294 00:15:11,241 --> 00:15:12,862 and you lose passengers. 295 00:15:20,413 --> 00:15:22,965 Lee Campbell flying home to New Zealand 296 00:15:23,068 --> 00:15:26,793 was sitting in row 10 just in front of the cargo door. 297 00:15:28,172 --> 00:15:30,965 I woke up with such a start 298 00:15:31,068 --> 00:15:34,862 because I had seen Lee standing by the bed. 299 00:15:34,965 --> 00:15:38,103 Just with a gray jacket over his arm 300 00:15:38,206 --> 00:15:40,275 and a small smile on his face. 301 00:15:40,379 --> 00:15:43,620 Of course as I woke up, it had faded. He was not there. 302 00:15:43,724 --> 00:15:47,103 And when we woke up in the morning, we discussed this. 303 00:15:47,206 --> 00:15:49,827 I said, it was strange, in the night. 304 00:15:49,931 --> 00:15:55,103 It was such a vivid dream, Lee was standing there. 305 00:15:56,172 --> 00:15:59,448 And then, the radio came on 306 00:15:59,551 --> 00:16:01,413 and the first item of news 307 00:16:01,517 --> 00:16:04,724 was that there'd been a problem with the United aircraft. 308 00:16:05,724 --> 00:16:09,206 And I said, that was Lee. That's Lee's. 309 00:16:09,310 --> 00:16:11,206 And my blood just ran cold. 310 00:16:11,310 --> 00:16:14,241 I knew he was dead from that moment. 311 00:16:19,862 --> 00:16:21,344 Centre, do you read? 312 00:16:21,448 --> 00:16:23,620 We evidently had a bomb or something. 313 00:16:23,724 --> 00:16:26,275 A big section of the right side of the airplane is missing. 314 00:16:27,275 --> 00:16:28,689 United 811 heavy, roger. 315 00:16:28,793 --> 00:16:30,517 I wouldn't go any faster than I had to. 316 00:16:30,620 --> 00:16:34,275 Because that pull... I mean, I wouldn't get it over 250 knots 317 00:16:34,379 --> 00:16:37,103 because that's a big-- - Okay. What's our stall speed? 318 00:16:37,206 --> 00:16:39,241 - I wouldn't go below 240. - Yeah. 319 00:16:40,413 --> 00:16:42,206 I don't know if we're going to make this. 320 00:16:42,793 --> 00:16:44,896 We didn't know that we were going to make it back. 321 00:16:45,000 --> 00:16:49,068 So we were actually preparing to ditch that plane at night 322 00:16:49,172 --> 00:16:53,068 in the Pacific Ocean which has never been done before. 323 00:16:54,137 --> 00:16:57,000 In the cabin, the crew prepared for the worst. 324 00:16:57,103 --> 00:17:01,137 My training kicked in and I got up from my jump seat 325 00:17:01,241 --> 00:17:04,413 and started instructing the crew 326 00:17:04,517 --> 00:17:06,793 that we have to prepare the cabin. 327 00:17:06,896 --> 00:17:09,448 We have to... prepare for a ditching 328 00:17:09,551 --> 00:17:11,689 which I thought was inevitable. 329 00:17:15,206 --> 00:17:17,103 We were running around getting life vests on 330 00:17:17,206 --> 00:17:18,793 and I do remember thinking: 331 00:17:18,896 --> 00:17:20,862 "I am not sure this is going to matter 332 00:17:20,965 --> 00:17:23,379 because when we hit the water, 333 00:17:23,482 --> 00:17:27,103 you know, I just imagine the plane is going to split apart." 334 00:17:30,379 --> 00:17:32,310 I knew that if we hit the water, 335 00:17:32,413 --> 00:17:34,068 it would be tantamount to hitting the ground 336 00:17:34,172 --> 00:17:36,379 and there would be very few if any survivors, 337 00:17:36,482 --> 00:17:39,000 so my mind went to... 338 00:17:43,275 --> 00:17:45,758 ...the things that meant something to me 339 00:17:45,862 --> 00:17:48,137 and at that point in my life, it was my son. 340 00:17:50,103 --> 00:17:52,034 Believing they were going to die, 341 00:17:52,137 --> 00:17:54,206 one passenger took these photographs, 342 00:17:54,310 --> 00:17:56,172 in the hope they'd be found in the wreckage 343 00:17:56,275 --> 00:17:58,758 and give clues to the cause of the crash. 344 00:17:59,551 --> 00:18:02,551 For 15 minutes, the plane steadily lost altitude. 345 00:18:02,655 --> 00:18:06,896 Then, at 4000 feet, the first glimmer of hope. 346 00:18:07,896 --> 00:18:11,034 After an imponderable time, I remember, 347 00:18:11,137 --> 00:18:13,758 one of the passengers began to point 348 00:18:13,862 --> 00:18:16,344 out one of the windows on the right side. 349 00:18:16,448 --> 00:18:18,034 And everybody looked 350 00:18:18,137 --> 00:18:19,862 and we looked through this little window 351 00:18:19,965 --> 00:18:20,965 from wherever we were, 352 00:18:21,068 --> 00:18:23,344 and we could see a point of light. 353 00:18:24,344 --> 00:18:26,413 And another point of light, and another point... 354 00:18:26,517 --> 00:18:28,586 And pretty soon, you could make out a coastline. 355 00:18:28,689 --> 00:18:30,379 Okay, I got lights over here. 356 00:18:30,965 --> 00:18:32,068 Okay. 357 00:18:32,620 --> 00:18:33,724 Okay. 358 00:18:33,827 --> 00:18:37,000 We're at 4, we're 21 miles out. 359 00:18:37,103 --> 00:18:38,551 We're in good shape. 360 00:18:40,586 --> 00:18:43,000 At Honolulu airport, an emergency was declared. 361 00:18:43,103 --> 00:18:45,379 All other aircraft were diverted 362 00:18:45,482 --> 00:18:48,034 and the rescue services prepared for the crash landing 363 00:18:48,137 --> 00:18:49,793 of a fully loaded airliner. 364 00:18:55,758 --> 00:18:57,275 You want to give me some speeds? 365 00:18:57,379 --> 00:18:58,586 Yeah. 366 00:18:59,448 --> 00:19:01,931 150 is going to be your 2 engine. 367 00:19:03,482 --> 00:19:05,034 Use 160. 368 00:19:05,137 --> 00:19:06,689 I need souls on board if you have it? 369 00:19:06,793 --> 00:19:09,034 Okay, souls on board. 370 00:19:09,137 --> 00:19:11,896 - 160 is the minimum. - Standby, United 811 heavy. 371 00:19:12,000 --> 00:19:13,620 I don't know how many are on board. 372 00:19:13,724 --> 00:19:17,965 200 and uh... I don't have the paperwork in front of me here. 373 00:19:18,068 --> 00:19:20,482 Uh, we're too busy right now. 374 00:19:20,586 --> 00:19:22,275 200 and something. 375 00:19:22,379 --> 00:19:23,586 Okay. 376 00:19:23,689 --> 00:19:25,379 Six minutes from the airport. 377 00:19:25,482 --> 00:19:29,172 The crew now had to slow the overweight plane for landing. 378 00:19:29,275 --> 00:19:31,586 But the effect of this was unknown. 379 00:19:34,793 --> 00:19:36,965 What's going to happen when I start coming out 380 00:19:37,068 --> 00:19:40,137 with flaps and landing gear, 381 00:19:40,241 --> 00:19:43,103 we're either going to land on the airport, 382 00:19:43,206 --> 00:19:46,034 in the water or downtown Honolulu. 383 00:19:49,551 --> 00:19:50,862 Okay, we'll try ten. 384 00:19:52,206 --> 00:19:53,620 Okay, inboards are coming at ten. 385 00:19:54,310 --> 00:19:55,827 How do the controls feel? 386 00:19:57,344 --> 00:19:59,000 Alright, so far. 387 00:20:01,379 --> 00:20:04,310 But the flaps were damaged and could not fully extend. 388 00:20:04,413 --> 00:20:06,034 This meant that flight 811 389 00:20:06,137 --> 00:20:08,413 would have to land dangerously fast. 390 00:20:11,931 --> 00:20:13,551 United 811 heavy. 391 00:20:13,655 --> 00:20:15,344 Do you have the airport in sight? 392 00:20:15,448 --> 00:20:17,068 It's over here to the right, Captain. 393 00:20:17,172 --> 00:20:19,517 - Okay. - Okay, we have the airport. 394 00:20:19,620 --> 00:20:21,068 United 811 heavy. 395 00:20:22,448 --> 00:20:25,310 811 is cleared to land 8 left. 396 00:20:25,413 --> 00:20:26,965 Equipment standing by. 397 00:20:27,068 --> 00:20:29,448 Wind is 0-5-0-1-2. 398 00:20:30,344 --> 00:20:31,827 Clear to land. 399 00:20:31,931 --> 00:20:34,689 8 left. United 811 heavy. 400 00:20:35,862 --> 00:20:39,068 As the unstable 747 lined up for landing, 401 00:20:39,172 --> 00:20:42,068 the pilots knew they would only have one attempt. 402 00:20:42,172 --> 00:20:44,413 But even if they got it on the runway, 403 00:20:44,517 --> 00:20:46,586 the nagging question remained: 404 00:20:46,689 --> 00:20:49,172 would the stress of impact cause the damaged 405 00:20:49,275 --> 00:20:52,068 and overweight aircraft to disintegrate? 406 00:20:56,655 --> 00:20:59,586 Severely damaged with an unstable airframe 407 00:20:59,689 --> 00:21:02,310 and losing altitude on just two engines, 408 00:21:02,413 --> 00:21:06,724 Flight 811 now began its final approach to Honolulu airport. 409 00:21:07,758 --> 00:21:09,275 Two engine approach. 410 00:21:09,379 --> 00:21:11,551 Two engine approach. 411 00:21:13,241 --> 00:21:15,551 We still had no idea how far off the ground we were, 412 00:21:15,655 --> 00:21:17,413 if we were going to make it to Honolulu or not. 413 00:21:17,517 --> 00:21:19,758 But that seemed like an appropriate time 414 00:21:19,862 --> 00:21:21,310 if we were somewhere around land, 415 00:21:21,413 --> 00:21:23,034 that we're probably going to try and land somewhere, 416 00:21:23,137 --> 00:21:26,413 to get the passengers in their brace positions. 417 00:21:26,517 --> 00:21:28,137 So that's when we started yelling 418 00:21:28,241 --> 00:21:30,275 for them to get down in their brace positions. 419 00:21:36,103 --> 00:21:41,103 Every molecule in my body combined to express: 420 00:21:42,551 --> 00:21:46,379 Get this damn airplane on the ground. 421 00:21:46,482 --> 00:21:48,551 How we doing on the hydraulics? 422 00:21:48,655 --> 00:21:51,551 Hydraulics are... good. 423 00:21:51,655 --> 00:21:52,758 Have we got brakes? 424 00:21:54,172 --> 00:21:56,000 Normal hydraulics. 425 00:21:56,103 --> 00:21:59,344 So, we've got brakes, but we're only going to have 426 00:21:59,448 --> 00:22:01,344 reversing on one and two. 427 00:22:03,068 --> 00:22:04,862 Though I thought maybe there was a chance 428 00:22:04,965 --> 00:22:07,551 that we were going to actually be able to attempt to land, 429 00:22:07,655 --> 00:22:09,379 the thought came to my mind: 430 00:22:09,482 --> 00:22:13,931 "What happens now, on impact, do we explode? 431 00:22:14,034 --> 00:22:17,172 Do we fall off this huge hole?" 432 00:22:18,172 --> 00:22:19,724 Despite dumping fuel, 433 00:22:19,827 --> 00:22:22,000 the aircraft was still critically overweight. 434 00:22:22,103 --> 00:22:24,517 But without full flaps to keep it in the air, 435 00:22:24,620 --> 00:22:26,172 it had to approach fast. 436 00:22:26,931 --> 00:22:28,000 1000 down. 437 00:22:28,103 --> 00:22:29,655 The danger was that the under carriage 438 00:22:29,758 --> 00:22:31,965 could shear off and the plane break up. 439 00:22:33,551 --> 00:22:34,620 A dot and half high. 440 00:22:38,482 --> 00:22:39,931 190... 441 00:22:43,862 --> 00:22:45,551 185... 442 00:22:49,344 --> 00:22:51,379 A little slow, a little slow, Dave. 443 00:22:51,482 --> 00:22:53,000 It's below what we want. 444 00:22:59,206 --> 00:23:01,137 Coming up on the glide slope. 445 00:23:03,896 --> 00:23:05,172 Okay. 446 00:23:05,275 --> 00:23:06,655 Now, let's try the gear. 447 00:23:09,206 --> 00:23:12,482 No one knew if the explosion had damaged the landing gear. 448 00:23:13,413 --> 00:23:14,689 I remember Laura saying to me 449 00:23:14,793 --> 00:23:16,482 that she didn't hear the landing gear go down. 450 00:23:16,586 --> 00:23:18,793 And it was loud. It was still loud. 451 00:23:18,896 --> 00:23:20,758 And I didn't hear the landing gear go down. 452 00:23:20,862 --> 00:23:22,241 So that's another thought: 453 00:23:22,344 --> 00:23:24,000 "Maybe they can't get their landing gear down. 454 00:23:24,103 --> 00:23:25,241 Maybe it's not down." 455 00:23:27,413 --> 00:23:28,724 I've got... 456 00:23:29,551 --> 00:23:31,379 Gear down and we're clear to land 457 00:23:31,482 --> 00:23:33,241 and everything is taken care of, as far as we know. 458 00:23:40,103 --> 00:23:41,172 200. 459 00:23:43,586 --> 00:23:44,724 195. 460 00:23:48,793 --> 00:23:50,275 Half a dot high. 461 00:23:53,551 --> 00:23:55,137 Looking... Looking good. 462 00:23:57,379 --> 00:23:58,620 192. 463 00:24:02,413 --> 00:24:03,413 195. 464 00:24:03,517 --> 00:24:04,896 I'm off on the power. 465 00:24:07,931 --> 00:24:09,068 100 feet. 466 00:24:14,896 --> 00:24:16,000 50 feet. 467 00:24:21,344 --> 00:24:23,241 Set other trim. Set other trim. 468 00:24:26,379 --> 00:24:27,517 30... 469 00:24:29,344 --> 00:24:30,758 10... 470 00:24:34,172 --> 00:24:35,275 Zero. 471 00:24:36,413 --> 00:24:37,965 We're on. 472 00:24:41,862 --> 00:24:43,655 Gear's holding. 473 00:24:45,034 --> 00:24:47,068 We landed. It felt fast. 474 00:24:47,172 --> 00:24:48,689 And that was my next concern, 475 00:24:48,793 --> 00:24:50,758 that we weren't going to stop at the end of the runway, 476 00:24:50,862 --> 00:24:52,448 that we were just going to keep going. 477 00:25:03,275 --> 00:25:05,482 And all of a sudden, we were slowing down, 478 00:25:05,586 --> 00:25:08,896 slowing down and I said, 479 00:25:09,000 --> 00:25:11,689 "Oh my God, we've landed, we're on the ground. 480 00:25:11,793 --> 00:25:14,517 And the people started applauding. 481 00:25:24,413 --> 00:25:27,310 Probably the best landing I've ever made. 482 00:25:27,413 --> 00:25:30,482 When we finally stopped on the runway, 483 00:25:30,586 --> 00:25:33,137 we deployed all the ten shoots 484 00:25:33,241 --> 00:25:37,620 and the flight attendants evacuated all the passengers. 485 00:25:38,793 --> 00:25:41,103 It's amazing how fast everyone went. 486 00:25:41,206 --> 00:25:43,586 My understanding is that in less than 45 seconds, 487 00:25:43,689 --> 00:25:46,310 330 people were off the airplane. 488 00:25:48,275 --> 00:25:50,103 We were probably 20 feet off the ground 489 00:25:50,206 --> 00:25:52,241 and I would have stepped out of that airplane without a slide. 490 00:25:52,344 --> 00:25:54,034 I wanted to get off so bad. 491 00:25:54,137 --> 00:25:56,827 Fortunately, there was a slide, I stepped into the abyss, 492 00:25:56,931 --> 00:26:00,344 fell into the slide, whooshed down to the bottom of the thing. 493 00:26:00,448 --> 00:26:04,103 And then, you hit, feet running. 494 00:26:05,206 --> 00:26:06,965 The slide kind of kicked me up 495 00:26:07,068 --> 00:26:09,862 and flew me up into the air and my thought was: 496 00:26:09,965 --> 00:26:12,206 "Oh my God, I am going to survive this whole thing 497 00:26:12,310 --> 00:26:13,896 and I am going to get wiped out here 498 00:26:14,000 --> 00:26:17,241 on the evacuation," because it just really threw me. 499 00:26:17,344 --> 00:26:20,724 And I landed and scraped up my legs pretty badly 500 00:26:20,827 --> 00:26:23,862 and landed on my feet and it wasn't until that moment 501 00:26:23,965 --> 00:26:25,862 that I had the sense of, 502 00:26:25,965 --> 00:26:28,862 "I am here. I'm okay. I'm on the ground." 503 00:26:31,586 --> 00:26:35,103 When we got all our switches off, 504 00:26:35,206 --> 00:26:37,586 I ran through the airplane to make sure there was 505 00:26:37,689 --> 00:26:40,793 no one else on the airplane, came up to the door one left, 506 00:26:40,896 --> 00:26:43,724 I went down the slide and came around the front 507 00:26:43,827 --> 00:26:45,448 and I saw that humungous hole 508 00:26:45,551 --> 00:26:47,965 on the side and I just couldn't believe it. 509 00:27:01,724 --> 00:27:03,344 By the grace of God, we made it. 510 00:27:03,448 --> 00:27:05,517 And it was an awesome experience. 511 00:27:05,620 --> 00:27:07,655 I would never want to go through that again. 512 00:27:11,689 --> 00:27:14,103 It was crazy, it was wild, 513 00:27:14,206 --> 00:27:17,517 it was scary all at the same time. 514 00:27:20,758 --> 00:27:21,862 Um... 515 00:27:23,310 --> 00:27:25,344 I just thought that that was the end 516 00:27:25,448 --> 00:27:26,827 and we were going to die. 517 00:27:26,931 --> 00:27:30,275 I mean, that was my first thought, that this is the end. 518 00:27:40,034 --> 00:27:41,758 But for the families of the nine people 519 00:27:41,862 --> 00:27:43,448 who were killed, 520 00:27:43,551 --> 00:27:46,172 the ordeal was only beginning. 521 00:27:46,275 --> 00:27:49,965 Kevin and Susan Campbell's son, Lee, had been flying home. 522 00:27:50,793 --> 00:27:53,344 About 3 o'clock in the afternoon, 523 00:27:53,448 --> 00:27:57,586 I think they said that there was no New Zealanders involved, 524 00:27:57,689 --> 00:28:01,034 but we just knew that it was Lee. 525 00:28:01,137 --> 00:28:04,482 And then, about, I suppose, a quarter of an hour later, 526 00:28:04,586 --> 00:28:07,206 we got a phone call from Chicago 527 00:28:07,310 --> 00:28:10,172 and they just said that they regret to inform us 528 00:28:10,275 --> 00:28:12,724 that our son was missing, presumed dead. 529 00:28:13,517 --> 00:28:16,793 And I guess about another hour after that, 530 00:28:16,896 --> 00:28:19,000 a policeman arrived at the door 531 00:28:19,103 --> 00:28:21,034 and he took one look at us and he says: 532 00:28:21,137 --> 00:28:22,827 "I can see that you've had the news." 533 00:28:23,931 --> 00:28:28,413 So um... it was just an awful, awful day. 534 00:28:29,965 --> 00:28:34,551 And it certainly didn't get much better for a long, long time. 535 00:28:40,586 --> 00:28:43,068 Although Lee's body had not been recovered, 536 00:28:43,172 --> 00:28:44,620 the Campbells' flew straight 537 00:28:44,724 --> 00:28:46,758 to the wrecked aircraft in Honolulu. 538 00:28:47,482 --> 00:28:51,379 Your initial feeling is that you want to be as close 539 00:28:51,482 --> 00:28:55,413 to the spot where your relative died. 540 00:28:56,724 --> 00:28:58,034 And that was the aircraft. 541 00:28:58,137 --> 00:29:03,448 So we had to immediately go and see the aircraft. 542 00:29:04,379 --> 00:29:06,379 The damage inside was horrific. 543 00:29:06,482 --> 00:29:09,413 Just... a total mess. 544 00:29:09,517 --> 00:29:11,034 And the hole in the side of the aircraft 545 00:29:11,137 --> 00:29:14,068 was much bigger than I had thought it would be, 546 00:29:14,172 --> 00:29:17,965 even though we had seen television newsreel reports. 547 00:29:19,344 --> 00:29:20,862 And it was so sad to get in 548 00:29:20,965 --> 00:29:23,724 and actually see where Lee's seat had been. 549 00:29:23,827 --> 00:29:26,310 The legs of the seat were still there. 550 00:29:26,413 --> 00:29:28,896 There was a good bit of fuselage beside him. 551 00:29:29,000 --> 00:29:30,724 And still a window. 552 00:29:33,310 --> 00:29:36,344 But the Campbell's desire to find the cause of Lee's death 553 00:29:36,448 --> 00:29:40,482 inevitably brought them face to face with dreadful details. 554 00:29:41,344 --> 00:29:44,689 They took us to the medical examiner's office as well... 555 00:29:44,793 --> 00:29:48,068 because they had found body parts and that sort of thing. 556 00:29:49,310 --> 00:29:50,758 So... 557 00:29:52,068 --> 00:29:53,827 They didn't actually show us the body parts, 558 00:29:53,931 --> 00:29:55,275 but they showed us bits and pieces 559 00:29:55,379 --> 00:29:57,137 they had recovered from the engines. 560 00:29:57,241 --> 00:30:00,862 And we got the medical examiner's report 561 00:30:00,965 --> 00:30:03,137 on what they had recovered. 562 00:30:03,827 --> 00:30:07,034 So, we really would have preferred that it was Lee 563 00:30:07,137 --> 00:30:08,206 that went through the engine 564 00:30:08,310 --> 00:30:10,310 because it would have been an immediate death, 565 00:30:10,413 --> 00:30:13,137 whereas it was a four-minute fall down to the ocean 566 00:30:13,241 --> 00:30:15,482 and we know that the people could have been alive 567 00:30:15,586 --> 00:30:17,137 as they were falling, 568 00:30:17,241 --> 00:30:19,827 and when you think about that, that is just horrific. 569 00:30:20,965 --> 00:30:24,655 As it became clear that their son's body would never be found, 570 00:30:24,758 --> 00:30:27,655 the Campbells' need to find the cause of the accident 571 00:30:27,758 --> 00:30:30,000 that killed him grew stronger. 572 00:30:31,586 --> 00:30:33,482 Lee can't have died for nothing. 573 00:30:33,586 --> 00:30:36,137 You've got to find out why he died. 574 00:30:36,241 --> 00:30:40,241 And you just gotta make sure that it never happens again. 575 00:30:43,655 --> 00:30:45,862 The Campbells embarked on a relentless 576 00:30:45,965 --> 00:30:49,482 personal investigation that would last nearly two years. 577 00:30:49,586 --> 00:30:53,172 The loss of their son meant they would stop at nothing to uncover the truth. 578 00:30:57,689 --> 00:31:00,482 The engines number three and four... 579 00:31:00,586 --> 00:31:03,655 Two months after the accident on Flight 811, 580 00:31:03,758 --> 00:31:06,275 when the National Transportation Safety Board 581 00:31:06,379 --> 00:31:07,793 held preliminary hearings, 582 00:31:07,896 --> 00:31:10,275 the Campbells made sure they were there. 583 00:31:10,379 --> 00:31:12,517 But they soon grew frustrated. 584 00:31:12,620 --> 00:31:16,034 The NTSB would not complete its report for months. 585 00:31:16,137 --> 00:31:19,206 So the Campbells took matters into their own hands. 586 00:31:19,310 --> 00:31:21,896 We certainly weren't going to leave it to the NTSB 587 00:31:22,000 --> 00:31:25,172 to come up with the findings, we were going to follow through. 588 00:31:25,275 --> 00:31:27,862 And when the hearings ended, they had said that we could take 589 00:31:27,965 --> 00:31:29,689 whatever we wanted off the press table 590 00:31:29,793 --> 00:31:33,206 and Susan walked up to the top table and said: 591 00:31:33,310 --> 00:31:35,862 "Oh, there's a really good set up here." 592 00:31:35,965 --> 00:31:38,241 So, grabbed a box 593 00:31:38,344 --> 00:31:42,275 and loaded all of the documents we could find up there. 594 00:31:42,379 --> 00:31:45,034 Kevin's the most honest of people, I know, 595 00:31:45,137 --> 00:31:47,068 but here he was taking something 596 00:31:47,172 --> 00:31:50,793 that we hadn't specifically been told we could take. 597 00:31:51,482 --> 00:31:53,758 And we were heading out the door, just as the NTSB 598 00:31:53,862 --> 00:31:57,034 were arriving back in with a trolley to pick up all the documents. 599 00:31:57,137 --> 00:32:00,275 So we were out the door and into a taxi and gone. 600 00:32:05,482 --> 00:32:07,275 So we quickly realized 601 00:32:07,379 --> 00:32:09,344 we had got a really good set of papers. 602 00:32:09,448 --> 00:32:12,517 With a lot of things that hadn't been released to the public. 603 00:32:12,620 --> 00:32:15,206 We were able to really start our investigation 604 00:32:15,310 --> 00:32:17,517 in earnest at that stage. 605 00:32:19,206 --> 00:32:20,931 The unpublished documents 606 00:32:21,034 --> 00:32:23,034 revealed a disturbing catalogue of problems 607 00:32:23,137 --> 00:32:24,724 with the forward cargo door, 608 00:32:24,827 --> 00:32:27,655 going right back to its original design. 609 00:32:31,896 --> 00:32:36,551 Instead of a plugged door that gets jammed into its frame as the aircraft pressurizes, 610 00:32:36,655 --> 00:32:39,413 Boeing opted for an outward opening door. 611 00:32:39,517 --> 00:32:41,758 This allowed for more cargo space, 612 00:32:41,862 --> 00:32:44,551 but was not fail-safe like the plug design. 613 00:32:44,655 --> 00:32:46,724 So Boeing built what they believed 614 00:32:46,827 --> 00:32:49,586 was a fool-proof locking mechanism. 615 00:32:49,689 --> 00:32:52,103 What they do is they built in multiple redundancies 616 00:32:52,206 --> 00:32:54,586 to make sure the door is properly latched 617 00:32:54,689 --> 00:32:56,517 and does not open. 618 00:32:56,620 --> 00:32:59,413 And you build it in to a point 619 00:32:59,517 --> 00:33:04,103 that is extremely improbable that the door would ever open. 620 00:33:07,344 --> 00:33:09,724 So what went wrong on Flight 811? 621 00:33:11,137 --> 00:33:13,379 The Campbells soon discovered that the problem 622 00:33:13,482 --> 00:33:15,862 lay in the design of the locking mechanism. 623 00:33:17,103 --> 00:33:19,655 To lock the cargo door on the 747, 624 00:33:19,758 --> 00:33:22,413 electric motors rotate C-shaped latches 625 00:33:22,517 --> 00:33:24,517 around pins in the door frame. 626 00:33:25,137 --> 00:33:28,655 A handle then moves arms known as locking sectors 627 00:33:28,758 --> 00:33:32,655 over top of the C-latches to prevent them from re-opening. 628 00:33:33,482 --> 00:33:35,620 But as early as 1975, 629 00:33:35,724 --> 00:33:38,862 problems were found with the locking sectors. 630 00:33:40,275 --> 00:33:43,034 Kevin Campbell, an engineer by training, 631 00:33:43,137 --> 00:33:46,310 built a model to show the weakness in the Boeing design. 632 00:33:46,413 --> 00:33:49,758 Initially, the locking sectors were made in aluminum, 633 00:33:49,862 --> 00:33:53,724 and in 1975, Boeing realized that they weren't strong enough. 634 00:33:53,827 --> 00:33:55,827 And they actually doubled up the aluminum 635 00:33:55,931 --> 00:33:57,758 to make it double thickness. 636 00:33:57,862 --> 00:34:00,310 But it still wasn't strong enough 637 00:34:00,413 --> 00:34:01,862 and a lot of the airlines 638 00:34:01,965 --> 00:34:03,655 didn't even put the doublers on anyway. 639 00:34:04,551 --> 00:34:06,068 The weakness of the aluminum 640 00:34:06,172 --> 00:34:07,724 drastically increased the risk 641 00:34:07,827 --> 00:34:09,689 of the door accidentally opening. 642 00:34:10,344 --> 00:34:12,827 With the aluminum locking sectors, 643 00:34:12,931 --> 00:34:16,482 if the C-locks tried to back wind, 644 00:34:16,586 --> 00:34:18,206 open electrically, 645 00:34:18,310 --> 00:34:21,344 it would just push the locking sector out of the way. 646 00:34:22,448 --> 00:34:25,620 It simply wasn't up to the job it was designed for. 647 00:34:27,620 --> 00:34:31,103 For 20 years, 747s have been flying 648 00:34:31,206 --> 00:34:33,137 with this crucial weakness. 649 00:34:40,931 --> 00:34:44,344 The Campbells wondered what else remained to be revealed. 650 00:34:45,000 --> 00:34:47,862 They redoubled their efforts to uncover the full truth 651 00:34:47,965 --> 00:34:50,586 behind the accident that had killed their son. 652 00:34:51,551 --> 00:34:54,793 We bought a car and set off in the United States 653 00:34:54,896 --> 00:34:59,965 to see as many people who were involved with the accident as possible. 654 00:35:00,068 --> 00:35:04,034 We started at Seattle, down to Denver, 655 00:35:04,137 --> 00:35:08,724 across to Chicago, through to Washington DC, 656 00:35:08,827 --> 00:35:12,068 down to Kentucky, on to Miami, 657 00:35:12,172 --> 00:35:15,862 and back across to San Diego, 658 00:35:15,965 --> 00:35:19,620 back up through San Francisco and back to Seattle. 659 00:35:19,724 --> 00:35:21,965 And that was just one trip. 660 00:35:24,068 --> 00:35:27,413 The Campbells soon found that a shockingly similar incident 661 00:35:27,517 --> 00:35:30,620 to Flight 811 had given clear warnings 662 00:35:30,724 --> 00:35:32,793 of the dangers in the cargo door. 663 00:35:38,586 --> 00:35:42,137 In 1987, two years before flight 811, 664 00:35:42,241 --> 00:35:45,379 a PAN AM 747 had been climbing out of Heathrow 665 00:35:45,482 --> 00:35:48,931 when it failed to pressurize at 20 000 feet. 666 00:35:49,724 --> 00:35:51,689 The pilots had to turn back. 667 00:35:52,862 --> 00:35:54,517 When they got back to Heathrow, 668 00:35:54,620 --> 00:35:56,793 they found out the door was hanging open an inch and a half 669 00:35:56,896 --> 00:36:00,482 at the bottom and all of the locks were open. 670 00:36:01,172 --> 00:36:02,586 When they got to the maintenance base, 671 00:36:02,689 --> 00:36:06,275 they found that all of the locking sectors 672 00:36:06,379 --> 00:36:08,206 were either bent or broken. 673 00:36:09,551 --> 00:36:11,482 Why had the C-latches turned 674 00:36:11,586 --> 00:36:13,724 and bent back the locking sectors? 675 00:36:14,517 --> 00:36:16,172 Boeing claimed that the ground crew 676 00:36:16,275 --> 00:36:17,862 must have mishandled the mechanism. 677 00:36:18,655 --> 00:36:20,689 The door had been closed manually 678 00:36:20,793 --> 00:36:24,000 and what they said happened was that the guy wound 679 00:36:24,103 --> 00:36:27,517 the C-latch closed, 98 turns of a speed wrench. 680 00:36:27,620 --> 00:36:31,000 He closed the... outer handle 681 00:36:31,103 --> 00:36:32,896 and then wound it open again. 682 00:36:33,000 --> 00:36:35,586 And to be in the position that they were found in 683 00:36:35,689 --> 00:36:37,034 when the aircraft got back, 684 00:36:37,137 --> 00:36:39,310 he would have had to wind them open 98 turns. 685 00:36:39,413 --> 00:36:41,586 And this is just absolutely ridiculous. 686 00:36:42,310 --> 00:36:44,517 But the Campbells' investigation uncovered 687 00:36:44,620 --> 00:36:47,965 another vital clue to why the C-latches are turned. 688 00:36:48,068 --> 00:36:50,620 A report by PAN AM engineers 689 00:36:50,724 --> 00:36:54,206 highlighted problems with the doors' electrical system. 690 00:36:54,310 --> 00:36:57,413 It had a fault in the S2 master lock switch, 691 00:36:57,517 --> 00:37:00,655 that should have turned off the power to the door 692 00:37:00,758 --> 00:37:02,793 when the outer handle was closed. 693 00:37:04,172 --> 00:37:06,275 This was an alarming finding. 694 00:37:06,379 --> 00:37:08,448 When the outer handle was closed, 695 00:37:08,551 --> 00:37:11,344 the S2 master lock switch was meant to disconnect 696 00:37:11,448 --> 00:37:15,034 the power supply and stop the C-latch motors from turning. 697 00:37:15,827 --> 00:37:17,379 So could this have failed, 698 00:37:17,482 --> 00:37:19,724 allowing the motors to open the door? 699 00:37:21,206 --> 00:37:25,413 To find out, Boeing asked the airlines to do a simple test. 700 00:37:25,517 --> 00:37:28,655 Close the outer handle, then press the switch 701 00:37:28,758 --> 00:37:31,103 to open the door and see what happens. 702 00:37:32,241 --> 00:37:35,206 When they hit the switch, it actually worked 703 00:37:35,310 --> 00:37:37,379 and Boeing thought this is not going to work. 704 00:37:37,482 --> 00:37:39,000 But it actually worked. 705 00:37:39,103 --> 00:37:40,965 There was power to the door locks 706 00:37:41,068 --> 00:37:44,344 with the outer handle closed, 707 00:37:44,448 --> 00:37:46,137 and the lock started to move 708 00:37:46,241 --> 00:37:47,862 and it started to force 709 00:37:47,965 --> 00:37:49,655 the locking sectors out of the way. 710 00:37:49,758 --> 00:37:52,241 And a few days later, 711 00:37:52,344 --> 00:37:53,965 the airline started ringing in 712 00:37:54,068 --> 00:37:56,137 and saying it was damaging their planes. 713 00:37:56,241 --> 00:37:58,206 So Boeing stopped the test. 714 00:37:58,310 --> 00:38:00,137 But it meant that on those aircraft, 715 00:38:00,241 --> 00:38:03,551 the S2 switch had failed which is a silent failure. 716 00:38:03,655 --> 00:38:04,931 And all of those aircraft 717 00:38:05,034 --> 00:38:08,827 were likely to have the same problem as 811. 718 00:38:08,931 --> 00:38:12,275 They were just waiting for a short circuit to open the doors. 719 00:38:12,379 --> 00:38:15,620 The Campbells now became convinced that the accident 720 00:38:15,724 --> 00:38:19,724 on Flight 811 began with a failure of the S2 switch. 721 00:38:19,827 --> 00:38:22,724 Power remained on to the C-latch motors. 722 00:38:22,827 --> 00:38:26,103 All it took was a short circuit in the 20-year-old wiring 723 00:38:26,206 --> 00:38:30,172 which had been found to be frayed on other aircraft to start the motors up. 724 00:38:30,275 --> 00:38:32,931 The aluminum locking sectors were too weak 725 00:38:33,034 --> 00:38:37,068 to stop the latches turning and the cargo door burst open. 726 00:38:41,448 --> 00:38:44,448 The National Transportation Safety Board determines 727 00:38:44,551 --> 00:38:46,689 that the probable cause of this accident... 728 00:38:46,793 --> 00:38:49,724 After waiting a year for the NTSB report, 729 00:38:49,827 --> 00:38:52,103 Kevin and Susan Campbell expected it to match 730 00:38:52,206 --> 00:38:55,758 their theory of what had led to the accident on Flight 811. 731 00:38:56,965 --> 00:38:58,862 I assumed that we would have a report come out 732 00:38:58,965 --> 00:39:00,965 that this was an electrical malfunction. 733 00:39:01,068 --> 00:39:03,310 And we were staggerd when they came out 734 00:39:03,413 --> 00:39:05,655 and said that the door had been mishandled. 735 00:39:05,758 --> 00:39:08,310 The report focussed entirely on the fact 736 00:39:08,413 --> 00:39:12,862 that the door lock must've been mishandled by the ramp attendant. 737 00:39:14,103 --> 00:39:18,310 That was disappointing and we felt 738 00:39:18,413 --> 00:39:20,275 that they must've been at a different hearing 739 00:39:20,379 --> 00:39:22,103 from the one we were at. 740 00:39:22,517 --> 00:39:27,137 So how had the NTSB come to their conclusion? 741 00:39:27,241 --> 00:39:29,413 There was other evidence that we had found 742 00:39:29,517 --> 00:39:33,068 during our investigation of improper procedures 743 00:39:33,172 --> 00:39:36,551 by the United mechanics and ramp people. 744 00:39:36,655 --> 00:39:38,896 So we were convinced that there was, 745 00:39:39,000 --> 00:39:42,275 we could use the word "abuse", being done on the doors. 746 00:39:42,379 --> 00:39:44,137 The doors were sort of abused 747 00:39:44,241 --> 00:39:46,275 and weren't maintained very well. 748 00:39:46,379 --> 00:39:49,758 We concluded that the probable cause was mechanical. 749 00:39:51,206 --> 00:39:54,344 For the Campbells, the NTSB's failure to mention 750 00:39:54,448 --> 00:39:57,655 the electrical problems just wasn't good enough. 751 00:39:57,758 --> 00:39:59,793 What they said happened was, 752 00:39:59,896 --> 00:40:02,137 the door was closed, 753 00:40:02,241 --> 00:40:04,827 the locks didn't fully close, 754 00:40:04,931 --> 00:40:09,206 they just partially closed, just hanging on... the pins. 755 00:40:10,137 --> 00:40:11,724 And then they closed the outer handle, 756 00:40:11,827 --> 00:40:14,482 but that simply can't happen 757 00:40:14,586 --> 00:40:17,793 because that part of the locking sector is still intact. 758 00:40:17,896 --> 00:40:19,724 It just simply cannot happen. 759 00:40:20,551 --> 00:40:22,896 You can't close the outer handle 760 00:40:23,000 --> 00:40:25,793 unless these are in the fully locked position. 761 00:40:26,655 --> 00:40:29,379 It's the only way that the outer handle will close. 762 00:40:29,482 --> 00:40:32,000 And just closing this manually, 763 00:40:32,103 --> 00:40:35,551 you can't exert enough force to actually damage 764 00:40:35,655 --> 00:40:37,344 this part of the locking sector. 765 00:40:37,448 --> 00:40:39,586 All it does is just butts up against there. 766 00:40:39,689 --> 00:40:41,413 If the locks aren't fully closed, 767 00:40:41,517 --> 00:40:43,275 it just simply butts up against them 768 00:40:43,379 --> 00:40:45,103 and goes no further. 769 00:40:58,896 --> 00:41:02,827 They went back to investigating the accident on Flight 811. 770 00:41:02,931 --> 00:41:05,275 And soon found disturbing evidence 771 00:41:05,379 --> 00:41:08,206 of how it could and should have been prevented. 772 00:41:11,724 --> 00:41:14,310 After the PAN AM incident in 1987, 773 00:41:14,413 --> 00:41:17,310 it turned out that Boeing had issued a directive 774 00:41:17,413 --> 00:41:19,551 to the airlines on how to correct 775 00:41:19,655 --> 00:41:22,275 the weak aluminum locking sectors. 776 00:41:22,379 --> 00:41:25,344 The airworthiness directive that came out 777 00:41:25,448 --> 00:41:28,931 was to replace the aluminum sectors with steel sectors 778 00:41:29,034 --> 00:41:30,517 that could not be bent. 779 00:41:30,620 --> 00:41:33,758 And there was some additionally interim requirements 780 00:41:33,862 --> 00:41:37,482 for inspections to be performed until what they call 781 00:41:37,586 --> 00:41:40,931 the terminating action, the steal sectors were installed. 782 00:41:42,103 --> 00:41:46,241 The fix was cheap and simple, but getting it done was not. 783 00:41:46,965 --> 00:41:49,172 The actual cost of the modification, 784 00:41:49,275 --> 00:41:51,344 changing these locking sectors to steel 785 00:41:51,448 --> 00:41:54,034 was 2 000 US dollars per aircraft, 786 00:41:54,137 --> 00:41:56,551 but it took ten hours to do it. 787 00:41:56,655 --> 00:41:59,241 And that's where the money was... 788 00:41:59,344 --> 00:42:01,896 Taking these aircrafts out of service for ten hours. 789 00:42:02,000 --> 00:42:03,482 That's millions of dollars. 790 00:42:05,586 --> 00:42:08,275 The Campbells found that back in 1987, 791 00:42:08,379 --> 00:42:11,275 the Federal Aviation Admin, who were meant 792 00:42:11,379 --> 00:42:12,655 to enforce improvements, 793 00:42:12,758 --> 00:42:15,068 had given the airlines 18 months 794 00:42:15,172 --> 00:42:17,275 to comply with the modification. 795 00:42:21,862 --> 00:42:25,379 Within a year, Lee Campbell and eight others would die 796 00:42:25,482 --> 00:42:27,275 in an avoidable accident. 797 00:42:28,517 --> 00:42:30,206 So why weren't the airlines 798 00:42:30,310 --> 00:42:32,482 forced to fix the problem sooner? 799 00:42:32,586 --> 00:42:35,620 If these airplanes, these large commercial airplanes, 800 00:42:35,724 --> 00:42:37,482 are grounded, 801 00:42:37,586 --> 00:42:39,758 it's an economic disaster. 802 00:42:40,379 --> 00:42:41,931 So what they do is they lobby 803 00:42:42,034 --> 00:42:43,448 with the regulatory agency, 804 00:42:43,551 --> 00:42:45,655 in the United States, it's the FAA, 805 00:42:45,758 --> 00:42:50,931 to allow them to do the fixes over time, 806 00:42:51,034 --> 00:42:53,482 when the airplanes are in for normal maintenance. 807 00:42:53,586 --> 00:42:57,344 And that way, they are not taken out of service. 808 00:42:58,172 --> 00:43:01,206 But when they do that, when they allow the airlines, 809 00:43:01,310 --> 00:43:04,758 the air carriers and the manufacturers to fix these over time, 810 00:43:04,862 --> 00:43:06,655 in essence what the FAA is doing 811 00:43:06,758 --> 00:43:10,482 is gambling with the lives of the passengers and the crew 812 00:43:10,586 --> 00:43:11,827 that are flying the airplanes 813 00:43:11,931 --> 00:43:13,413 during the time they are not fixed. 814 00:43:14,241 --> 00:43:16,206 After the deaths on flight 811, 815 00:43:16,310 --> 00:43:18,896 the FAA instantly shortened the deadline 816 00:43:19,000 --> 00:43:23,758 for fixing the cargo door from 18 months to just 30 days. 817 00:43:37,724 --> 00:43:41,034 It was only when United had gone from one of the airlines 818 00:43:41,137 --> 00:43:43,827 of first resort to one of the airlines of last resort 819 00:43:43,931 --> 00:43:47,379 in New Zealand that they... just totally out of the blue, 820 00:43:47,482 --> 00:43:50,827 we got a letter inviting us over to see them. 821 00:43:51,620 --> 00:43:55,586 And when we got there, they were just going to do a PR exercise on us. 822 00:43:55,689 --> 00:43:58,862 But we just laid into them, 823 00:43:58,965 --> 00:44:01,862 pointed out where they had got it wrong. 824 00:44:01,965 --> 00:44:05,517 And you could see them changing during it 825 00:44:05,620 --> 00:44:08,758 to realizing that we did know what we were talking about. 826 00:44:08,862 --> 00:44:11,448 That we had put a lot of serious effort into it. 827 00:44:11,551 --> 00:44:13,655 One of them actually broke down. 828 00:44:13,758 --> 00:44:16,758 Because they'd never had to meet next of kin before. 829 00:44:17,655 --> 00:44:21,827 And it ended up with the Vice President of United 830 00:44:21,931 --> 00:44:25,034 taking us around the maintenance facility. 831 00:44:25,137 --> 00:44:27,586 And he had people running off in all directions, 832 00:44:27,689 --> 00:44:29,413 just to get the information that we wanted, 833 00:44:29,517 --> 00:44:31,000 getting questions answered. 834 00:44:31,103 --> 00:44:33,448 We could go anywhere that we wanted. 835 00:44:33,551 --> 00:44:36,827 And we just... Everything was laid on for us 836 00:44:36,931 --> 00:44:39,103 because at that stage they realised 837 00:44:39,206 --> 00:44:41,655 that we really did know what we were talking about. 838 00:44:43,275 --> 00:44:44,862 The pressure of the Campbells' campaign 839 00:44:44,965 --> 00:44:46,896 eventually began to pay off. 840 00:44:47,000 --> 00:44:49,965 The vital piece of evidence that could prove them right, 841 00:44:50,068 --> 00:44:54,206 the cargo door, still lay two miles down in the Pacific Ocean. 842 00:44:55,241 --> 00:44:57,655 But as articles appeared in the American press, 843 00:44:57,758 --> 00:45:01,586 the NTSB commissioned the US Navy to search for it. 844 00:45:03,000 --> 00:45:05,310 A hundred miles south of Honolulu, 845 00:45:05,413 --> 00:45:08,620 a deep submersible began to trawl the sea bed. 846 00:45:10,724 --> 00:45:12,448 We went to Honolulu. 847 00:45:12,551 --> 00:45:15,862 And waited there while they had their attempts. 848 00:45:15,965 --> 00:45:18,275 And they finally recovered the door 849 00:45:18,379 --> 00:45:19,965 from 14 000 feet of water 850 00:45:20,068 --> 00:45:23,517 which was the deepest recovery ever at that time. 851 00:45:24,310 --> 00:45:27,724 And we were phoned within an hour of it coming out of the water. 852 00:45:29,034 --> 00:45:30,896 But before the Campbells could see it, 853 00:45:31,000 --> 00:45:34,724 the door was swiftly removed to Boeing's plant in Seattle. 854 00:45:36,068 --> 00:45:38,448 The Campbells went in hot pursuit. 855 00:45:39,206 --> 00:45:44,241 We went over to Boeing and they wouldn't show it to us. 856 00:45:45,275 --> 00:45:47,862 So, they reckoned that the crucial pieces 857 00:45:47,965 --> 00:45:49,482 had gone to the NTSB. 858 00:45:50,758 --> 00:45:53,068 So again, we got in the car 859 00:45:53,172 --> 00:45:55,620 and drove across to Washington DC. 860 00:45:59,827 --> 00:46:02,862 We arrived at Ron Leesh's office. 861 00:46:03,379 --> 00:46:05,172 And Ron looks at his watch and he says, 862 00:46:05,275 --> 00:46:06,827 "I can give you 5 minutes." 863 00:46:07,758 --> 00:46:09,965 So, about three hours later, 864 00:46:10,068 --> 00:46:13,724 we had the pieces that were recovered in our hand. 865 00:46:13,827 --> 00:46:16,827 And they acknowledged that we were definitely correct, 866 00:46:16,931 --> 00:46:19,000 it was an electrical malfunction. 867 00:46:19,103 --> 00:46:21,448 And they said they would fix the planes, 868 00:46:21,551 --> 00:46:23,413 they would make sure it never happened again, 869 00:46:23,517 --> 00:46:24,689 but just don't hold your breath 870 00:46:24,793 --> 00:46:26,103 that the report would ever be changed. 871 00:46:27,068 --> 00:46:29,896 Even with the evidence of an electrical malfunction 872 00:46:30,000 --> 00:46:33,862 in their hands, the NTSB refused to change their report. 873 00:46:33,965 --> 00:46:38,344 Then, in June 1991, fate intervened. 874 00:46:38,931 --> 00:46:41,517 A four-year-old United 747 875 00:46:41,620 --> 00:46:43,586 was sitting on the apron in New York, 876 00:46:43,689 --> 00:46:48,620 when the C-latch motor started up and the door opened itself. 877 00:46:49,758 --> 00:46:51,655 There was no way that they could hide it any longer. 878 00:46:51,758 --> 00:46:52,827 They simply couldn't deny 879 00:46:52,931 --> 00:46:54,482 that it was an electrical malfunction 880 00:46:54,586 --> 00:46:55,620 that was covering it. 881 00:47:00,724 --> 00:47:04,896 Finally, the NTSB publicly issued a revised report 882 00:47:05,000 --> 00:47:07,034 that concurred with the Campbells' version. 883 00:47:07,896 --> 00:47:12,000 There was an inadvertent failure of either the switch 884 00:47:12,103 --> 00:47:16,000 or the wiring that caused an uncommanded opening of the door. 885 00:47:18,896 --> 00:47:21,586 It's nice that other people know that you are right 886 00:47:21,689 --> 00:47:23,620 and had been all along 887 00:47:23,724 --> 00:47:26,758 and the support that they were giving you was vindicated. 888 00:47:28,241 --> 00:47:31,068 The Campbells spent thousands of dollars of their own money 889 00:47:31,172 --> 00:47:32,586 on their campaign. 890 00:47:33,413 --> 00:47:36,068 They were never interested in a financial settlement 891 00:47:36,172 --> 00:47:38,448 for Lee's death, but they did persuade 892 00:47:38,551 --> 00:47:40,448 United and Boeing to set up 893 00:47:40,551 --> 00:47:42,827 a university scholarship in his name. 894 00:47:44,103 --> 00:47:45,724 I couldn't have lived with myself 895 00:47:45,827 --> 00:47:49,241 if we had done no investigating ourselves. 896 00:47:49,344 --> 00:47:52,379 It was just something we both felt we needed to do. 897 00:47:52,482 --> 00:47:54,103 We didn't even discuss it. 898 00:47:54,206 --> 00:47:56,655 We just knew that's what we would do. 899 00:47:56,758 --> 00:47:57,965 Yeah. 900 00:48:00,862 --> 00:48:02,827 But despite long and public campaigns 901 00:48:02,931 --> 00:48:04,517 like that of the Campbells', 902 00:48:04,620 --> 00:48:06,655 critics fear that the airline industry 903 00:48:06,758 --> 00:48:09,379 has not learned the lessons from Flight 811. 904 00:48:09,482 --> 00:48:12,862 The regulatory agencies, they have a dual charge. 905 00:48:12,965 --> 00:48:15,137 One is to encourage aviation 906 00:48:15,241 --> 00:48:16,827 and the other is aviation safety. 907 00:48:16,931 --> 00:48:18,310 And when you get into a position 908 00:48:18,413 --> 00:48:20,793 where you have economics up against air safety, 909 00:48:20,896 --> 00:48:25,103 they tend to err on the side of economics rather than safety. 910 00:48:26,413 --> 00:48:30,655 Serious accidents caused by known defects have continued to occur. 911 00:48:30,758 --> 00:48:34,896 In the 1990s, known problems with icing on aircraft wings 912 00:48:35,000 --> 00:48:36,793 caused a series of crashes. 913 00:48:37,517 --> 00:48:39,862 At least three planes have had fatal fails 914 00:48:39,965 --> 00:48:43,827 due to known dangers from flammable insulation material. 915 00:48:43,931 --> 00:48:49,172 And in 1996, a fully laden 747 blew itself up 916 00:48:49,275 --> 00:48:51,068 when known faults in the wiring 917 00:48:51,172 --> 00:48:53,275 are thought to have ignited flammable vapours 918 00:48:53,379 --> 00:48:54,827 in the fuel tanks. 919 00:48:54,931 --> 00:48:57,758 Inevitably, experts are skeptical 920 00:48:57,862 --> 00:48:59,793 about the aviation industry's record 921 00:48:59,896 --> 00:49:02,862 of balancing profit against prevention. 922 00:49:03,551 --> 00:49:06,206 We've seen the wiring problem in both United 811 923 00:49:06,310 --> 00:49:08,931 which eventually turned out to be the cause of that accident, 924 00:49:09,034 --> 00:49:13,965 and also in TWA 800 where we had an explosion in the fuel tank. 925 00:49:14,068 --> 00:49:19,655 The industry's answer to 20 and 30-year-old wiring... 926 00:49:20,758 --> 00:49:25,241 And when the wiring can fray, break, crack, cause a short, 927 00:49:25,344 --> 00:49:28,344 which can either ignite fuel like in TWA 800, 928 00:49:28,448 --> 00:49:30,931 or open a cargo door like in United 811. 929 00:49:31,034 --> 00:49:32,413 What the industry says: 930 00:49:33,551 --> 00:49:35,137 "Don't touch it. 931 00:49:35,241 --> 00:49:37,689 Don't go in there. Don't inspect it. 932 00:49:37,793 --> 00:49:40,413 Don't try to fix it. Don't try to remove it. 933 00:49:40,517 --> 00:49:42,482 Because it is so brittle 934 00:49:42,586 --> 00:49:44,275 that if you go in there to try to fix it, 935 00:49:44,379 --> 00:49:46,137 you're gonna do more damage than you can do good." 936 00:49:47,379 --> 00:49:49,827 And that's what I call the ostrich approach 937 00:49:49,931 --> 00:49:51,379 to maintenance and safety. 938 00:49:51,482 --> 00:49:54,137 You know, we've decided that you can have 939 00:49:54,241 --> 00:49:59,517 a spark of ignition in a fuel tank of a large air carrier. 940 00:49:59,620 --> 00:50:01,586 But so far, we've been lucky, 941 00:50:01,689 --> 00:50:03,310 we've only had one every ten years. 942 00:50:03,413 --> 00:50:05,551 We've only blown up three or four airplanes. 943 00:50:05,655 --> 00:50:07,827 You know, to go in and replace this wiring, 944 00:50:07,931 --> 00:50:09,517 to ground all these airplanes, 945 00:50:09,620 --> 00:50:11,241 would be astronomically expensive. 946 00:50:11,344 --> 00:50:13,586 You know, one airplane every ten years, 947 00:50:13,689 --> 00:50:15,172 one airplane every five years, 948 00:50:15,275 --> 00:50:18,241 200 or 300 people... Cost of doing business. 949 00:50:18,344 --> 00:50:20,241 Cost of doing business. 950 00:50:20,344 --> 00:50:22,655 And that's a great economic analysis 951 00:50:22,758 --> 00:50:25,724 and unless your mother or your child 952 00:50:25,827 --> 00:50:27,482 is on board one of these airplanes 953 00:50:27,586 --> 00:50:31,137 that happens to pay the price for their economic satisfaction. 954 00:50:37,379 --> 00:50:40,103 For some of the survivors of Flight 811 955 00:50:40,206 --> 00:50:41,793 the cost has been heavy. 956 00:50:42,793 --> 00:50:44,551 Each crew member handled it differently. 957 00:50:44,655 --> 00:50:47,931 I know that there are still two crew members 958 00:50:48,034 --> 00:50:50,551 that have never set foot on an aircraft again. 959 00:50:51,655 --> 00:50:53,689 It was very difficult for me. 960 00:50:53,793 --> 00:50:58,172 I was diagnosed with severe post-traumatic stress disorder. 961 00:50:58,862 --> 00:51:01,896 You can't reason, you can't think, 962 00:51:02,000 --> 00:51:06,482 making the slightest decision is... very difficult. 963 00:51:06,586 --> 00:51:08,413 You are just at a total loss. 964 00:51:08,517 --> 00:51:10,448 So it was very difficult to cope with. 965 00:51:13,103 --> 00:51:15,206 difuze